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Students’ Attitudes Toward Religion
For a number of years now people have been crossing swords 
over the question of the permissibility, propriety, and usefulness 
of adopting innovations of a religious orientation in the secular 
schools of Russia. In defending their positions, both those who 
support it and those who oppose it appeal to various arguments 
that are convincing in some way. Nonetheless, the experiment of 
teaching the Orthodox culture, which began in the early 1990s 
and was renewed on a new organizational level at the end of the 
1990s and at the beginning of the new century, continues to spread 
all over the country. In the past year alone it has been taken up in 
Kaluga oblast, Krasnodar krai, Orel oblast, and Riazan oblast, and 
both Belgorod and Briansk oblasts have legislated the introduction 
of the subject “Orthodox Culture” as a part of the regional com-
ponent of general education. In the opinion of analysts, although 
the situation is not clear cut when it comes to the level of demand 
for courses in religious studies of a denominational orientation in 
schools in most large cities of Russia, what is most realistic in the 
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future (although it is not indisputable) is an “option according to 
which Orthodox elective subjects will continue to be adopted in 
state and municipal schools” [4, p. 30].
The problem of the study of religion in the system of secular edu-
cation, in the long run, hinges on the reproduction of religiousness 
in the secular school and, more broadly, in Russian society space, 
via the process of mass education. It is the prospect of expanded 
reproduction of religious consciousness, of religious psychology 
and practices as a possible result of the corresponding educational 
policy, that is the main point of contention between those who 
support and those who oppose the denominational approach in 
the mass secular school. While those who are in favor of it see it 
as a last effective tool against the “spiritual impoverishment” and 
degraded antivalues of the Western mass culture that flooded Rus-
sia in the 1990s, those who are against it are fearful of religious 
fundamentalism, fanaticism, extremism, and other manifestations 
of sociocultural backwardness that must inevitably go hand in hand 
with today’s “religious boom.”
In our opinion, the balance that has become established in 
society between the social interests and forces that support and 
oppose having religion in the system of general secular education 
makes it essential that this problem be taken out of the context of 
a primarily ideological standoff and channeled into the context 
of well-considered and objectively based decisions that, as far as 
possible, take into account all of the arguments on the two sides 
from the position of an open-minded, critical attitude toward the 
arguments themselves. This can be facilitated by stating the problem 
of the reproduction of religiousness in a secular society in terms of 
the interaction of two different types of cultures: the secular culture 
that is directly forming present-day public consciousness, and the 
denominational culture, which, to a large extent, is being artificially 
“grafted” onto this consciousness at a time when the cultural and 
political influence of religion is becoming stronger and the social 
position of the church is becoming more firmly established.
From this angle, the problem is one of complex components, in 
the form of a number of interconnected questions: (1) the extent 
to which the present secular culture, in its “pure” form, remains 
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socially constructive—that is, can legitimize the most important 
social values and ensure the normal socialization of the younger 
generation; (2) the extent to which religion actually has an influ-
ence on secular forms of the consciousness of the younger genera-
tion; and (3) the character of that influence, whether constructive, 
destructive, or neutral. These are the main questions that confront 
the researcher studying the educational effect of today’s religious 
renaissance in a secularized society.
In this connection, it is of special interest to the researcher 
studying contemporary religious and cultural processes to look 
at the generation that was born in the late 1980s and early 1990s; 
their primary socialization coincided with the systemic crisis in 
the secular society of Russia and with religion’s and the church’s 
escape from the sociocultural ghetto of the Soviet era, as well as the 
religious renaissance in Russia. This is the generation, represented 
by the graduates of the general education schools in the past few 
years, which, in our opinion, reflects most contrastively in its life 
and world, the collisions of the interaction between the secular 
culture and the religious culture in a situation of sociocultural 
instability.
As is well known, the reverse side of the development of secular 
culture and its increasingly firmly established leading position in 
public life, was the secularization—the contraction of the “social 
world of religion” [2, p. 700], manifested in policies that forced 
religious meanings, symbols, and practices out of social, cognitive, 
and actively participatory circulation. The resulting situation has 
been characterized by us as an asymmetry of the representative-
ness of cultures of the secular and the religious type in the social 
space [8, pp. 27–31]. At the present time, the sociocultural “main-
stream” is almost exclusively in the hands of secular cultural pat-
terns. Regardless of their attitude toward religion, just about all of 
the members of present-day society are subjects or carriers of the 
secular culture. Corresponding to this state of affairs is the mass 
biographical assimilation of the secular culture “by the natural 
method,” in the process of the primary socialization and incultura-
tion of the individual.
In contrast, as a rule the religious culture is not internalized by 
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today’s individual in childhood, through any “natural” assimilation 
of some particular denominational tradition; instead, it is formed as 
a result of one’s conscious, willed, personal choice at a more or less 
mature age. “The development of the industrial society led to the 
breakdown of the traditional way of life and, as a consequence, to a 
change in the means by which the religious tradition is reinforced. 
The traditional society in Russia was distinguished by a closed 
cycle of compliance with it; in the secularized and modernized 
society, on the other hand, this cycle has been characteristically 
broken” [3, p. 159].
And so, the secular culture can be viewed as a sociocultural 
constant. It is present in the consciousness, the world, and the life 
of the individual and of society, as a primary, all-encompassing 
expression of social knowledge. Today’s individual is not able to 
turn away from his secularity, since it has entered into him, it has 
formed and continues to reproduce his social nature. In its turn, the 
religious culture is a kind of “sociocultural variable,” and whether 
it is brought into vital circulation depends on the position of the 
social entity, on that person’s conscious choice of life strategy. As 
a consequence, even if he accepts religious forms of consciousness 
and behavior as a guide to action, today’s individual remains secular 
in terms of his sociocultural base. His acceptance of religion does 
not do away with his initial secularness, but it does confront him 
with the problem of how mutually to reconcile and adapt the two 
“habituses” that are different in nature.
Following from this is a fundamental aspect to which the soci-
ology of religion has not paid enough attention. In contemporary 
society, one’s religiousness does not represent so much a synonym 
of affiliation to the religious culture as a counterweight to the 
secular culture, but rather as a sign that one is affiliated simulta-
neously with both of these cultures. Given the vigorous expansion 
of religion, and the attempt of secular consciousness to find its 
bearings in a socium that is in crisis, the epicenter of the problem 
of the interaction between the secular and the religious is shifted 
out of the intersubject space and into the space of the individual’s 
life and world.
Accordingly, the main question is how to determine the patterns 
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that govern the interaction between the cultures of the religious type 
and the secular type in the individual consciousness and, on the 
basis of these patterns, how to study the specific processes going 
on in people’s minds.
It is reasonable to assume that under certain circumstances, where 
the secular culture and the religious culture are accommodated in 
the individual consciousness, there is an extreme principle in ac-
tion, namely a dominance of religion, since religious meanings by 
definition are linked to the sphere of the sacred [16, p. 156]; they 
are linked to certain overarching values. Without this dominance, 
they lose their religious meaning, without which, as a rule, they also 
lose their mutual bond, they are either forced out or they become 
completely assimilated by the secular culture.
For this reason, when a person turns to religion in our time it 
comes about by way of a more or less dramatic clash between the 
religious meanings that he has acquired and the secular patterns of 
social knowledge assimilated earlier: “In a situation where there 
has been a loss of institutions that provide for the traditional incul-
cation of religiousness in childhood and in a person’s early stage 
of socialization, such as having a religious family, or a system of 
religious educational institutions, the mechanism for the inculcation 
of religiousness ends up being ‘overturned’” [12, p. 100]. These 
days, religion does not serve to form a person’s basic knowledge 
about the world, about the social and interpersonal relations out of 
which his ideas about the meaning and purpose of life organically 
flow. Religion becomes a part of the individual’s life and world 
exactly on the level of these latter things, whereas the foundation 
of his social knowledge in terms of values and worldview turns out 
not to be correlated with it. The task of achieving that correlation, 
the task of achieving a value and logical integration of the secular 
and the religious content of his life and world, is something that a 
person has to deal with for the rest of his life.
 As a consequence, the emergence and firm establishment of 
religiousness in the individual requires more than just a simple 
replacement of the secular sociocognitive structures that are basic 
to his consciousness, with some kind of religious structures that are 
symmetrical to them; instead, it requires that the latter be placed 
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firmly “above” the secular structures and, in time, that they “grow 
and flourish” on that soil.
The problem is to figure out the extent to which (and which 
part of) current secular culture is to be included in the process of 
integration: which of its basic elements, along with religious con-
sciousness, will become a part of the solid nucleus of the synthetic, 
representative culture of the individual personality, and which will 
drift to the periphery. On the one hand, this will directly determine 
whether the religiousness being inculcated in young people today 
(including in general secondary education) will be “socialized” 
and “domesticated” in accordance with the customary norms and 
conceptions that are accepted in society, or whether it will become 
marginalized and remain in opposition to the fundamental purposes 
and values of the secular culture. On the other hand, it will deter-
mine whether the secular culture will be able to take advantage of 
the spiritual and cultural potential of the religious traditions in order 
to overcome the state of crisis and achieve a new impetus in socio-
cultural development. In the long run, these results will determine 
who is right: those who support introducing religion into the “holy 
of holies” of education—the schools, or those who consistently are 
in favor of protecting the purity of secular traditions.
Hence, a person who has ended up in the sphere of the influence 
of the religious culture is not free to stop being a carrier of secular 
culture. He is free only to choose a social and cognitive strategy 
that orients him toward a particular measure and quality of cor-
relation between the secular culture and the religious culture in his 
life. At the same time, the array of such strategies is limited by the 
extreme principle of the “maximalism” of the religious culture, 
which either forces the secular culture to submit to it or else itself 
becomes completely absorbed into the secular culture.
Consequently, the objective of the present study was to determine 
the main social and cognitive strategies of students’ attitudes toward 
religion, and to correlate them with the characteristics of the basic 
elements of social knowledge that are authentic for them.
In consideration of the above, the following propositions served 
as the basis of the methodology of the study:
(1) as a socially significant human quality, religiousness is based 
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on the individual’s assimilation or inculturation of the religious 
culture of a particular faith;
(2) any culture, including the religious culture, is a self-orga-
nizing systemic whole that develops from a particular subminimal 
state to a state that is relatively complete and full;
(3) the religiousness of today’s individual is a result of the in-
teraction between the secularized, secular culture that defines the 
individual’s life and world from the outset, and the denominational 
religious culture that he places at the center of his world and life 
and which transforms it as time goes on.
To construct an empirical and analytical model of the main vari-
ants of the interaction between the secular culture and the religious 
culture, given the asymmetry of their representation, we made use 
of A. Schutz’s generalized typology of relevancies [15, p. 193]. In 
accordance with that typology it is possible to single out four basic 
positions toward which relations between the representatives of the 
secular culture and the religious culture gravitate in the conscious-
ness of the entity. 
The first position assumes religion’s and the religious culture’s 
maximum relevance in the life and world of the individual. Ac-
cording to this position, religion represents a stable, independent 
value and goal for the individual. In accordance with the principle 
of dominance, religion exerts a defining influence (and, in time, a 
progressive influence) on the formation of the individual’s overall 
life strategy.
The second position corresponds to a solid “instrumental” 
attitude that presumes that religion and the elements of the cor-
responding religious culture are perceived as a means by which to 
achieve certain other objectives. Corresponding to this position, in 
our opinion, is the “desanctification of the Orthodox faith, while 
still acknowledging its value as a social institution” [1, p. 94], 
which L.G. Byzov classifies among the basic characteristics of 
the mentality of the nucleus of the new Russian way of thinking 
[ibid., p. 94].
The third position is similar to the second one, but it is different 
from it owing to the unstable, situational character of the indi-
vidual’s attitude toward religion. In this case, religiousness does 
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not represent for the individual any kind of stable frame of mind; 
religion does not represent a conscious value, but it can, for a while, 
serve as such, depending on the situation.
And finally, the last position, the fourth position, designates the 
irrelevancy of religion, where the individual has no use for it in his 
life strategy and tactics. In the light of such a disposition, religion 
is practically devoid of interest to the individual (which, of course, 
does not rule out the possibility that he has assimilated particular 
elements of it in the secular context).
Now it is necessary to correlate this gradation with the indica-
tors of the individual’s attitude toward religion—his religiousness 
or its absence. It is essential to note at the outset that the criteria 
for determining religiousness that are so widespread today in the 
sociology of religion, criteria that are based on the total of particular 
ideas and worship practices, are not fully in keeping with the re-
quirements of the concrete historical approach. That way of stating 
the question, in our opinion, entails an “automatic” expression of 
religious impulses in traditional religious and cultural forms and 
virtually ignores the sociocultural catastrophe and the rupture of 
tradition that befell religion in Russia in the twentieth century.
For this reason, the task of today’s researcher of religion is com-
ing to involve the search for and substantiation of different indica-
tors that will make it possible to detect an “emerging” religiousness 
on the part of the individual under the conditions of the “dispersed 
forms of the assertion and reproduction of the religious tradition” 
[3, p. 277]. In this connection, as Zh.T. Toshchenko has rightly 
pointed out, these things “ought not to exclude, as well, people’s 
intuitions, their predisposition to accept particular dogmas of the 
church, which symbolizes common sense and the requirements of 
morality that are safeguarded by the people and by time. In our 
opinion, this is the kind of approach that makes it possible to deter-
mine the degree of the population’s religiousness more accurately 
and objectively, without bias, without putting belief and unbelief 
in opposition to each other” [14, p. 159].
We have already presented an elaborated substantiation of the 
conception of the qualitative conversion of a subject from a state 
of “not involved in religion” into a state of religiousness, based on 
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a comparative analysis of the approaches to the determination of 
religiousness that are established in the sociology of religion in this 
country [9, pp. 153–68]. Let us cite the conclusions that serve as the 
conceptual base for the formulation of a methodology of empirical 
analysis of secular vis-à-vis religious intercultural interaction.
From our point of view, the mere fact that a respondent defines 
himself as “a believer” and “an Orthodox believer” (and, likewise, 
as a “Muslim,” a “Catholic,” or a representative of some other 
traditional religion or faith), is not sufficient to classify him as 
such. As has been pointed out more than once by M.P. Mchedlov, 
very often “religious self-identification is not made on the basis 
of actually being affiliated with some particular religion but rather 
on the basis of assigning oneself to a particular culture or national 
way of life” [10, p. 50]. For this reason, as we seek to determine 
the actual level of religious culture empirically, we are going on 
the basis of a combination of the respondent’s subjective indica-
tor of his religiousness (his self-identification in terms of religion 
and denomination), and its objective indicator, mainly the fact that 
in the life and world of the respondent there is a minimal aspect 
of the relevant religious culture, in which the potential of its self-
organization is concentrated. At the same time, the actual degree 
of the development of such an aspect—the number of its structural 
elements and the complexity of the connections among them, does 
not play a fundamental role. What does play a role is its potential, 
the possibility in the future of rising to a degree of development 
that will make it possible to integrate the subject’s social knowledge 
and, in this way, to make a cultural synthesis of the basic secular 
component and the “new” religious component. In its most harmo-
nious variant, such a synthesis will, in certain key features, resemble 
P.A. Sorokin’s integrated or “idealistic” system of culture—“a more 
or less balanced compound of ideational and emotional elements, 
with, however, a preponderance of ideational elements. . . . Its needs 
and aims are spiritual and material, but the material aspects are 
subordinate to the spiritual aspects” [13, p. 50].
From our point of view, the necessity and sufficiency of the 
objective component of the criterion of religiousness are met by 
the individual’s value orientation toward the priority of the value 
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of religious belief. This orientation is expressed with maximum 
precision in this passage from the Gospel “Lord, I believe! Help 
thou mine unbelief!” [Mark 9:24]. What that means is that for the 
individual, the value of religious faith is of a terminal character: the 
individual does not feel that he has reached the necessary state of 
belief, but strives to do so since it represents a very important—if 
not the most important—value and goal of his life. That kind of 
craving for belief is the constant of religiousness (and at the same 
time the minimum of involvement in the religious culture) that 
characterizes the individual as one who “is already affiliated” with 
religion. At any rate, this can be rightly applied to the Christian 
traditions. As far as the subjective component of the criterion 
of religiousness is concerned, moreover, which is expressed in 
the indicators of the respondents’ religious and denominational 
self-identification, their main function is to orient the individual 
toward a specific religious culture. Consequently, if an individual 
for whom religious belief is a value that is of a terminal character 
subjectively considers himself to be a believer and identifies with 
the Orthodox tradition, for example, then it is reasonable to say 
that his consciousness includes a minimal aspect of the Orthodox 
religious culture.
 We submit that what constitutes a sociologically relevant crite-
rion of an individual’s religiousness is the religious culture that has 
become firmly rooted in his consciousness and has a substantial 
influence (whether actual or potential) on his manner of thinking 
and way of life. In the case of the specific individual or group, the 
subminimal indicator of the presence of that culture is expressed 
in the value dominant of religious belief that is combined with the 
corresponding religious and denominational self-identification 
(for example, “believer” and “Orthodox”). Such a combination is 
an indication that a systemic nucleus of self-organizing religious 
culture has come to be formed in the consciousness of the indi-
vidual (or the set of people), a nucleus that in time is capable of 
transforming the entire initial secular cultural representant in the 
corresponding key.
We have taken the integrated aggregate set of sociocultural val-
ues to serve as the basis of the social and cognitive structure of the 
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cultural representant. “The system of values forms the inner core 
of the culture, the spiritual quintessence of the needs and interests 
of people and social communities” [7, p. 47]. To a large extent, the 
values, which are the basic guidelines of social knowledge, deter-
mine the basis of cultural identity. At the same time, we supplement 
the hierarchical approach to the analysis of the correlation of values 
that is traditional in sociology, in accordance with which “the hier-
archy of values is determined by the basic conceptions about what 
is the most important and significant for the individual as these are 
prevalent in the specific culture” [1, p. 543], with a syndromatic 
approach that takes account of “combinations of value choices that 
consist of central, nuclear ideas about what is good, and values that 
are peripheral with respect to these nuclei” [6, p. 56].
To serve as a simplified sociocognitive matrix of intercultural 
interactions we compiled and tested a scale consisting of twenty 
value positions, including nineteen secular terminal values and the 
control value “religious belief.” The method of the study was based 
on comparing and contrasting the structure of the respondents’ 
values and the way that the structure is connected with a change in 
the relevance of the value of religious belief. To serve as absolute 
indicators of the relevance of axiological elements we made use of 
the parameters of the mean value and mean quadratic deviation. For 
the purpose of discerning any latent or hidden patterns and tenden-
cies with respect to the functional relation between axiological ele-
ments of social knowledge of interaction of cultures, we made use 
of cluster analysis (the Clustering Method Simple Average program 
[Weighted Pair-Group] with the “Manhattan” distance type, which 
is included in the licensed package of the NCSS 2003 and PASS 
2002 programs). With a high degree of probability the combination 
of the minimal mean connections and the maximum tightness of 
cluster connections characterizes that set of values as the nucleus 
of a sociocognitive structure, a nucleus that determines the chief 
guidelines of the consciousness and the behavior of the subject. A 
lowering of the corresponding indicators goes hand in hand with 
the values’ transition into the status of peripheral values.
In the course of an empirical study we conducted in September 
and October 2005, a survey was made of a sample contingent of 
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students in Belgorod, Moscow, and Nizhnii Novogorod oblasts 
between the ages of fourteen and seventeen (n = 710). The survey 
was carried out on a quota, multistage sample: equal quotas were 
maintained in terms of gender, place of residence (city or coun-
tryside), and in accordance with the criterion of whether religious 
disciplines of a denominational (Orthodox) orientation were or 
were not studied in the schools.
Among the contingent of young students who were surveyed, the 
study found all four basic positions that correspond to the various 
social and cognitive strategies for overcoming the contradictions 
between the representants of the secular culture and the religious 
culture.
The first position that corresponds to the criterion of religiousness 
designated above characterizes 24.8 percent of the sample set. All 
of them, while they are secular people owing to their social origin 
and were given a “conventional” secular upbringing in the home 
and in school, nonetheless identify themselves as religious believers 
of the Orthodox faith, and they back this up by acknowledging the 
priority (the terminal character) of their value orientation toward 
religious belief and the corresponding self-identification. Accord-
ingly, these young people are classified as those who have in some 
way allowed elements of the Orthodox religious culture into their 
consciousness. These elements have the potential to become fixed 
in their consciousness and to further develop the acculturative 
religious complex. In doing so they face the problem of finding a 
permanent resolution to the contradictions between the authentic 
elements of their social knowledge that were shaped by the secular 
culture and the elements that have been borrowed from the “socio-
cultural table” of the Orthodox culture.
The characteristics of the respondents who have adopted that 
position, compared with analogous characteristics of those who 
have taken different positions in regard to religious culture, are of 
particular importance in the context of our study. This subgroup of 
respondents, with a high degree of probability, today represent the 
primary if not the only “human resource” of any actual influence 
by the Russian Orthodox Church in the mass general education 
schools, and, accordingly, they represent one of the most important 
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potentials for the church’s social influence in the foreseeable future.
On the other hand, the “secularist” variants of the development 
of the secular culture are presumably represented by the second 
position, which looks at religious belief as a kind of tool, and the 
fourth position, in which religious belief is virtually on the brink of 
irrelevancy. In the case of the second position, the value of religious 
belief (and, accordingly, everything that has to do with religion) is 
solidly legitimized in the consciousness of the subject as a service-
able, instrumental value; attempts to legitimize it as a terminal value 
are potentially capable of provoking internal, personal conflicts in 
the subject who is a representative of that cultural attitude. A total 
of 21.4 percent among the sample set held that position.
In the case of the fourth position, religious belief does not have 
any kind of significant value to the individual at all; for that indi-
vidual, religion is basically a matter of indifference. This position 
characterizes 17.5 percent of the sample.
And finally, the third position (making up 27.9 percent of the 
sample), by definition corresponds to the mindset of “situational” 
religiousness; it is not of a solid character. It is our opinion, at 
the same time, that this specific status position is connected with 
potential changes and risks of secular-religious intercultural inter-
action. Theoretically, interpersonal conflicts are quite likely in the 
group that represents this cultural attitude, in connection with the 
possible polarization of attitudes toward religion.
And so, on the basis of the findings of the survey it is reasonable 
to suggest that we can say that religion (in this case, Orthodox Chris-
tianity) has a real influence on about one-quarter of the graduates of 
secondary general education schools whose primary socialization 
took place under conditions of the “religious boom” and the general 
sociocultural crisis of the 1990s and after. Nonetheless, this still 
does not enable us to judge how strongly expressed this influence 
is and what its qualitative characteristics are.
We can obtain an idea of how the complex of the Orthodox 
culture that is taking shape in the consciousness of the younger 
generation is influencing the secular culture by comparing the value 
hierarchy of respondents’ religious and secular subgroups.
In the opinion of a number of authoritative social thinkers, a 
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sociocultural split has been formed in Russia and is becoming 
deeper. It “runs through the very nucleus of people’s values and 
divides them in terms of their attitudes toward problems of exis-
tence, toward major problems. People take different positions not 
because the ‘truth’ is not complete or that they lack information, 
but rather as a consequence of their moral choice. To put it another 
way, two different systems of moral values have come into being 
in Russia, and each of them has its own flag and its own language” 
[5, p. 312]. What this refers to are the traditional and the neoliberal 
systems of values, the latter characterized by a pronounced antisys-
temic influence on the traditional Russian social code. A.S. Panarin 
summarizes this as follows: “The new liberal doctrine legitimizes 
wholesale corruption, civic irresponsibility, money grubbing in-
stincts, and even outright national treason in accordance with the 
ideology of unlimited individualism and the morality of success” 
[11, p. 225]. In this connection it is of particular interest to verify 
the comparative influence on the value sphere of students by that 
ideology, on the one hand, and traditional religion (the Orthodox 
religion), on the other hand.
In accordance with the data of the cluster analysis as verified 
by statistical indicators of mean values and the mean quadratic 
deviation, all four status positions are characterized by a constant 
content of the sociocognitive nucleus. This nucleus is represented 
by the values “health,” “family,” and “education.” On the whole, 
this corresponds to the representative national data of a survey of 
values conducted under the aegis of the “Tomsk Initiative” project 
in 2000, according to which “in all groups of respondents . . . the 
first few values . . . are absolutely identical” [1, p. 188]. The rel-
evant group of values, as a rule, included “health,” “family,” and 
“security.” Since we did not include on the list the strongest “vital” 
values, such as “life,” “security,” and so on, with the exception of 
the value “health,” the place of the latter was held by the value 
“education.”
In three subgroups out of four subgroups (the second status po-
sition was the exception), the value “motherland” was also added 
to the axiological elements listed above. These values in all of the 
subgroups that represent the main status positions, are character-
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ized by the lowest indicators of provisional mean values (1.1–1.3 
in the case of the value “health”; 1.1–1.4 in the case of the value 
“family”; and 1.3–1.5 in the case of the value “education”) and 
by some of the smallest indicators (0.4–0.7; 0.5–0.8; and 0.6–0.8, 
respectively). At the same time, analysis consistently records a 
high level of density of the cluster connections among these values, 
one that either corresponds to the maximum on the tree diagram 
or approaches it.
Nonetheless, the differences both in the makeup of the basic 
value structures and in the hierarchy of the elements that form them 
seem indicative. For example, the highest level of relevance for the 
first status position marks the values “religious belief,” “family,” 
“motherland,” “respect for the elderly,” “health,” and “educa-
tion.” According to the criteria substantiated above, these are the 
axiological elements that, with the highest degree of probability, 
make up the value structure of the social and cognitive pattern 
that forms the life and world of the first subgroup of students. It is 
characteristic, moreover, that the indicator of the distance between 
the closest elements of the first cluster—the values of “religious 
belief” and “family” (0.144) is a great deal lower than the indica-
tors of the distance between the closest values in the other status 
subgroups (from 0.285 to 0.332). This provides indirect indication 
of the presence of latent or even explicit ideas that link them in the 
consciousness of the respondents in the first subgroup.
In turn, the analogous indicators of the second and fourth sub-
groups, which represent solidly secular status positions, differ from 
the indicators of the first subgroup to the same extent that they 
are similar among themselves. In both the second and the fourth 
subgroup of respondents the composition of the nucleus of the so-
ciocognitive pattern included just three basic axiological elements 
(“health,” “family,” and “education”). Any difference between the 
corresponding status positions in this regard was manifested only 
in the priorities. For example, the second position is character-
ized by the maximum closeness of the link between “health” and 
“education,” whereas the value “family” is farther away from them, 
an indication that the first two values have higher priority. On the 
other hand, the fourth position exhibits the maximum correlation 
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between the values “health” and “family,” whereas the value of 
education lags a bit behind them.
As far as the third status position is concerned, the value nucleus 
of the social and cognitive structure that corresponds to that position 
is also represented by the cluster “health”— “family”—“education.” 
In this regard, the corresponding subgroup of students showed an 
almost identical similarity to the fourth position. Any occasional 
turning to religious belief does not bring most of the members of 
this subgroup to substantial change in their inner world, and it 
remains on the level of a superficial social sentiment.
A number of conclusions follow from the data cited above.
—In the first place, no substantial differences in the most 
important value orientations were found between religious and 
nonreligious respondents. Accordingly, neither religiousness nor 
its absence revealed any connection with fundamental changes in 
the constant value priorities.
—Second, the respondents’ assimilation of a system-forming 
element of the Orthodox religious culture is linked to a notice-
able expansion of the axiological nucleus of the current culture. 
This provides evidence of the value constructive function of the 
Orthodox religious complex, which, for respondents, legitimizes 
the important sociocultural values (in short supply these days) of 
“motherland” and “respect for the elderly.”
—Third, the expansion of the axiological nucleus in the case of 
religious believers is taking place exclusively on the basis of the 
values that have been traditionally legitimized in the Orthodox reli-
gious culture as among the most important ones (“motherland” and 
“respect for the elderly”). This also provides indirect evidence that 
the corresponding value priorities are linked to the religiousness of 
the students and find religious legitimization in their consciousness. 
This assumption is corroborated by the fact that these “accompany-
ing” values, which have been introduced into the nucleus along with 
the value of religious belief, show a considerably higher degree of 
closeness of the cluster connections with this matter, compared to 
the constant values of the nucleus of the secular culture (with the 
exception of the value “family”).
In sum, on the whole the individual’s attitude toward religion 
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derives from the meeting and established interaction between 
the secular culture and the religious culture in his life and world. 
One’s lack of religiousness means one has essentially put religious 
culture out of one’s life and perceives religion as a purely external 
reference. Conversely, the presence of religiousness involves an 
ongoing “unwrapping” (as V.V. Nalimov has put it) of the semantic 
package of some particular religious culture of a particular de-
nomination. In the former case the individual is confined within the 
meaningful horizon of the secular culture that he is familiar with, 
and he either keeps himself distant from any active assimilation of 
religious cognitions or else selectively assimilates a few of them 
as peripheral elements of his life and world. In the latter case, on 
the other hand, the individual initiates active interaction between 
the elements of the secular culture that he assimilated “with his 
mother’s milk” and the actual elements of the religious culture of 
the religion that he wants to and strives to profess. Correspond-
ing to this process is the individual’s practical involvement in the 
sociocultural space of the religion he has chosen, his secondary 
inculturation or socialization.
The findings of the survey have shown that the axiological 
nucleus of the social and cognitive representant that is relevant 
to the respondents maintains its constant content without regard 
to whether the relevance of religion and the religious culture in-
creases or diminishes in their life. Consequently, the anticipated 
“breakdown” of Russian secular culture in terms of values, amid 
the formation of social and cognitive strategies of attitudes toward 
religion, did not occur, and any polarization of societal values does 
not constitute a decisive factor to account for why young people 
turn to or distance themselves from religion.
Proceeding on this basis, there are insufficient grounds for pre-
dicting an implacable conflict of values in the foreseeable future 
between secular culture and Orthodox religious culture among the 
students surveyed. The data obtained provide evidence that the 
contradiction between religious and secular consciousness is not 
overlaid on any fundamental axiological fracture within the secular 
culture, which as a result of such an overlay could come to serve as 
the basis for a protracted permanent conflict between the Orthodox 
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religiousness that is being reborn and the secular culture that still 
retains its social “advantage.”
At the same time, it is instructive to note that three-quarters of 
the students surveyed, who objectively hold an unreligious position, 
exhibited fewer differences in the composition and correlation of 
their value priorities. This provides evidence not only of perceptible 
divergences between young people who are or are not believers, 
but also of a predominant secularity in the value and worldview 
attitudes and orientations of the kind of subject of general education 
who was shaped during the “era of changes” in the 1990s. As the 
findings have shown, so far this secularity has not been destructive; 
it has not tended to push the most socially significant values onto the 
periphery of the individual’s life or to replace them with the values 
of individualism and hedonism. The secular culture that has been 
assimilated by young people whose primary socialization took place 
during the catastrophic postmodern era in Russia, even though that 
culture has lost its most effective ideological guidelines, continues 
to retain its constructive potential as it remains standing on a solid 
platform of tradition. It is reasonable to suggest that this circum-
stance fosters the constructive influence of the Orthodox religious 
culture on the religious consciousness of the respondents.
At the same time, along with the aspects that they have in com-
mon, there is a significant difference in the number and structure 
of authentic cultural representants in the case of the respondents 
whose value and worldview choice is for the Orthodox religious 
and cultural tradition and those who retain a secular outlook. The 
young people’ assimilation of the dominant of religious belief has 
shown a link with real changes in their sphere of values and in 
their life as a whole. Moreover, there is good reason to believe that 
these changes are constructive, since they go hand in hand with 
an expansion of the axiological nucleus thanks to important tradi-
tional values such as “motherland” and “respect for the elderly,” 
and they are spreading to about one-quarter of the senior students 
in the secondary general education schools, students of the middle 
of the first decade of the twenty-first century. We hope to verify 
the data obtained definitively by means of a survey conducted on 
a national representative sample.
auguSt  2008 89
References
1. Bazovye tsennosti rossiian: sotsial’nye ustanovki. Zhiznennye strategii. 
Simvoly. Mify [The Basic Values of Russians: Social Attitudes, Life Strate-
gies, Symbols, and Myths], ed. A.V. Riabov and E.Sh. Kurbangaleeva. 
Moscow: Dom Intellektual’noi Knigi, 2003.
2. Bell, D. “Ot sviashchennogo k svetskomu” [From the Sacred to the 
Secular]. In Religiia i obshchestvo: khrestomatiia po sotsiologii religii 
[Religion and Society: A Reader in the Sociology of Religion], comp. 
V.I. Garadzha and E.D. Rutkevich. Moscow: Aspekt Press, 1996.
3. Glagolev, V.S. “Istoricheskie i sovremennye funktsii religioznoi traditsii 
v Rossii” [The Historical and Contemporary Functions of the Religious 
Tradition in Russia]. In Religiia v izmeniaiushcheisia Rossii. Materialy 
Rossiiskoi nauchno-prakticheskoi konferentsii. t. 1 [Religion in a Chang-
ing Russia. Materials of a Russian Scientific and Practical Conference. Vol. 1]. 
Perm: PGTU, 2004.
4. Kanevskii, K. “Vzaimootnosheniia svetskoi shkoly i religioznykh 
ob”edinenii: pravovoi aspekt” [Relations Between the Secular Schools 
and Religious Associations: The Legal Aspect]. Religiia i pravo, 2005, 
no. 2, pp. 30–32.
5. Kara-Murza, S.G. Manipuliatsiia soznaniem v Rossii segodnia [The Ma-
nipulation of Consciousness in Russia Today]. Moscow: Algoritm, 2001.
6. Klimova, S., and Galitskii, A. “Novyi podkhod k izucheniiu tsennostei” [A 
New Approach to the Study of Values]. In desiat’ let sotsiologicheskikh 
nabliudenii [Ten Years of Sociological Observations], pp. 56–83. Moscow: 
Institut Fonda “Obshchestvennoe mnenie,” 2003.
7. Lapin, N.I.; Beliaeva, L.A.; Naumova, N.F.; and Zdravomyslov, A.G. 
dinamika tsennostei naseleniia reformiruemoi Rossii [The Dynamics of 
the Values of the Population of Russia Undergoing Reform]. Moscow: 
Editorial URSS, 1996.
8. Lebedev, S.D. dve kul’tury: religiia v rossiiskom svetskom obrazovanii 
na rubezhe XX–XXi vekov [Two Cultures: Religion in Russian Secular 
Education at the Turn of the Twenty-First Century]. Belgorod: Izdatel’stvo 
Belgorodskogo Gosuniversiteta, 2005.
9. Lebedev, S.D. “Religioznost’: v poiskakh ‘rubikona’” [Religiousness: 
In Search of a “Rubicon”]. Sotsiologicheskii zhurnal, 2005, no. 3, pp. 
153–68.
10. Mchedlov, M.P.; Gavrilov, Iu.A.; Kofanova, E.N.; and Shevchenko, 
A.G. “Konfessional’nye osobennosti religioznoi very i predstavlenii o ee 
sotsial’nykh funktsiiakh” [The Denominational Characteristics of Reli-
gious Belief and Perceptions of Its Social Functions]. Sotsiologicheskie 
issledovaniia, 2005, no. 6, pp. 46–56.
11. Panarin, A.S. Strategicheskaia nestabil’nost’ v XXi veke [Strategic Insta-
bility in the Twenty-First Century]. Moscow: EKSMO, 2004.
12. Pankov, A.A., and Podshivalkina, V.I. “Problema vosproizvodstva reli-
gioznogo soznaniia v posttotalitarnom obshchestve” [The Problem of the 
Reproduction of the Religious Consciousness in a Post-Totalitarian 
90 RuSSian  Education  and  SociEty
Society]. Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniia, 1995, no. 11, pp. 99–103.
13. Sorokin, P.A. Sotsial’naia i kul’turnaia dinamika. issledovanie izmenenii 
v bol’shikh sistemakh iskusstva, istiny, etiki, prava i obshchestvennykh 
otnoshenii [Social and Cultural Dynamics. A Study of Changes in Large 
Systems of Art, Truth, Ethics, Law, and Social Relations]. St. Petersburg: 
RKhGI, 2000.
14. Toshchenko, Zh.T. Paradoksal’nyi chelovek [The Paradoxical Person]. 
Moscow: Gardariki, 2001.
15. Shiutts, A. Smyslovaia struktura povsednevnogo mira: ocherki po fenome-
nologicheskoi sotsiologii [The Meaning Structure of the Everyday World: 
Essays on Phenomenological Sociology]. Moscow: Institut Fonda  
“Obshchestvennoe mnenie,” 2003.
16. Eliade, M. Sviashchennoe i mirskoe [The Sacred and the Profane]. Mos-
cow: MGU, 1994.
to order reprints, call 1-800-352-2210; outside the united States, call 717-632-3535.

